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Abstract
Games are traditionally recognized as one of the key testbeds underlying progress in artificial intelli-
gence (AI), aptly referred to as the “Drosophila of AI”. Traditionally, researchers have focused on using
games to build strong AI agents that, e.g., achieve human-level performance. This progress, however,
also requires a classification of how ‘interesting’ a game is for an artificial agent. Tackling this latter
question not only facilitates an understanding of the characteristics of learnt AI agents in games, but
also helps to determine what game an AI should address next as part of its training. Here, we show
how network measures applied to so-called response graphs of large-scale games enable the creation of
a useful landscape of games, quantifying the relationships between games of widely varying sizes, char-
acteristics, and complexities. We illustrate our findings in various domains, ranging from well-studied
canonical games to significantly more complex empirical games capturing the performance of trained AI
agents pitted against one another. Our results culminate in a demonstration of how one can leverage
this information to automatically generate new and interesting games, including mixtures of empirical
games synthesized from real world games.
Introduction
Traditionally, games have played a pivotal role in artificial intelligence (AI) research and have been extensively
investigated in machine learning, ranging from abstract benchmarks in game theory over popular board games
such as Chess13,94 and Go93, to realtime strategy games such as StarCraft II110 and Dota 273. Chess and
Go have been referred to as the Drosophila of AI research 62; in recent years, other games such as Poker
and StarCraft have reached a similar status in the AI community, witnessed by impressive results such as
Libratus12 and AlphaStar110. However, AI research has, so far, primarily seeked to answer the question of
how to build strong learning agents; we refer to this as the ‘Policy Problem’. In short, the ‘Policy Problem’
entails the search for (super) human-level AI behavior in the vast space of all possible strategies (also known
as policies in the reinforcement learning literature) that can be learned by an artificial agent. In this work, we
instead consider the inverse perspective also known as the ‘Problem Problem’, defined as “the engineering
problem of generating large numbers of interesting adaptive environments to support research” by Leibo
et al. 56 . This definition raises a critical question: what makes a game ‘interesting’ enough for an AI agent
to learn to play?
While the importance of games as a natural research platform for the development of learning algorithms
and the measurement of progress in AI is well-established83,89,102,121, the significance of the inverse problem
remains largely underexposed but is expected to play a critical role for the algorithmic development of
future AI entities general enough to solve complex tasks15. To enable progress towards solving the Problem
Problem, we first need to investigate the underlying notion of what it means for a game to be ‘interesting’
in the first place, or more fundamentally, how to characterize the topological landscape of games.
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Figure 1: A landscape of games revealed by the proposed response graph-based workflow. Notably, variations
of games with related rules are well-clustered together, indicating strong similarity despite their widely-
varying raw sizes. Instances of Blotto cluster together, despite their payoff table sizes ranging from 20× 20
for Blotto(5,3) to 1000 × 1000 for Blotto(10,5). Games with strong transitive components (e.g., variations
of Elo games, AlphaStar League, Random Game of Skill, and Normal Bernoulli Game) can be observed to
be well separated from strongly cyclical games (Rock–Paper–Scissors and the Disc game). Closely-related
real-world games (e.g., Hex, Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four and each of their respective Mise`re counterparts)
are also well-clustered together.
For instance, one can consider simple characterizations of a game as quantified by cardinal measures,
such as the number of strategies available, players involved, number of outcomes possible, or boolean mea-
sures, such as whether the game is symmetric, or whether it requires reasoning with imperfect information.
One could also order the payouts to players, as done, for instance, in prior works exploring the space of
2× 2 games58,79. For more complex games, however, such measures are quite crude, failing to disambiguate
differences in games with identical structures. In many instances, it seems more useful to consider measures
that somehow characterize the strategic interactions in the game. As such, an alternative perspective is to
consider the nuances in behavioral variations used in the game (e.g., under observed human play); unfortu-
nately, such measures can be subjective or difficult to quantify. One may also seek to classify games from
the standpoint of computational complexity. Games have long provided an interesting source of problems
under this perspective, and the celebrated PPAD-completeness result22 shows that in general, computing
equilibria for games is a hard problem. Despite this, a game that is computationally challenging to solve may
not necessarily be interesting to play (e.g., consider a two-player game where one player chooses a string S,
and the other needs to find a string S′ such that a cryptographic hash of S′ is S). Thus, it is evident that
designation of a single measure quantifying the inherent topological landscape over games is a non-trivial
task. As such, one of the central motivations of this paper is that, practically speaking, there is a rich
hierarchy of complexity within the class of interesting real-world games.
To help narrow down the properties used to expose the topological landscape of games (and help identify
or generate games of interest), we revisit the advances made in the context of the ‘Policy Problem’, which
targets evaluation and training of capable agents. A number of these recent works have considered the prob-
lems of evaluating and training agents with complex behaviors or interactions4,5,6,42,43,44,53,60,66,72,82. Many
of these works focus on analyzing the interactions within populations of agents, relying on game-theoretic
models capturing pairwise relations between them to enable novel training or evaluation schemes. Related
models have considered the transitive-intransitive inter-agent relations to study games from a dynamical sys-
tems perspective3,103. Moreover, the recent work of Czarnecki et al. 20 investigated the geometric structure
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of symmetric zero-sum two-player games from an information-theoretic perspective, with particular empha-
sis again on transitive-intransitive relations. Fundamentally, the topological structure exposed by modeling
pairwise agent interactions seems to be the key enabler of the powerful training and ranking techniques
introduced in the above works.
In related literature, graph theory has been well-established as a useful framework for topological analysis
of systems involving a large number of interacting entities9,24,107; complexity analysis via graph-theoretic
techniques span across the application domains of social networks90,115, the webgraph25,32, biological sys-
tems10,57,75, econometrics40,96, and linguistics111; despite this, graph-theoretic techniques have been sig-
nificantly less so explored for characterization of the topological structure of games. In this paper, we
demonstrate that the combination of graph theory and game-theoretic models of pairwise agent interactions
provides the appropriate tools for analyzing the structure of general-sum, many-player games.
From a graph-theoretic perspective, the interacting entities (nodes) of interest in our work are either
strategies (in abstract games) or AI agents (in empirical games, where strategies correspond to learned or
appropriately-sampled player policies). The interactions between these agents, as quantified by the game’s
payoffs, constitute the structure of the graph under analysis. The specific transition structure studied here
corresponds to the so-called α-Rank response graph of the game, which has played a key role in recent works
targeting evaluation and training in large-scale games66,72,82. The response graph generated by α-Rank
yields useful insights into the inherent structure of the game, and we demonstrate that the complexity of
this underlying graph is closely related to the complexity of solving the game itself.
The primary contribution of this work is a graph-based analytical toolkit that exposes the topological
structure of a given collection of games. We use this toolkit to characterize a number of games, by first
analyzing canonical and synthetically-designed games with well-defined structures, then extending to larger-
scale empirical games datasets including Poker, AlphaGo, and StarCraft II, yielding a landscape of games as
visualized in Figure 1. We demonstrate correlation of the complexity of the graphs associated with games with
the complexity of solving the game itself. This analysis culminates in a demonstration of how the topological
structure over games can be used to tackle the ‘interestingness’ question of the ‘Problem Problem’, which
seeks to automatically generate games or domains with characteristics interesting for learning agents56.
Importantly, curriculum learning has proven to be important for agents to learn complex tasks, starting
from simpler ones, as part of the earlier mentioned ‘Policy Problem’. Devising such curricula is difficult
and mostly done manually. Therefore, automated curricula hold great promise and become easier to achieve
when being able to navigate the landscape of games, and as such providing means to automatically generate
games of various levels of complexity will aid in solving the ‘Problem Problem’.
Results
We develop a foundational graph-theoretic toolkit that facilitates analysis of canonical and real-world large-
scale games, providing insights into their related topological structure in terms of their high-level strategic
interactions. We illustrate the toolkit in various games that are both popular with humans and wherein
AI agents have reached human-level performance, including Go, MuJoCo Soccer, and StarCraft II. We also
show how this toolkit can be used to automate generation of games (which can, for example, subsequently
be used to train AI agents on).
We start this section with a simple motivating example to solidify intuitions and explain the workflow
of our graph-theoretic toolkit. The prerequisite game theory background and technical details are provided
in the Methods section, with full discussion of related works and additional details in the Supplementary
Information.
Motivating example and workflow
We first motivate our graph-theoretic method by considering a class of games with an intuitive parametric
structure in the player payoffs. Specifically, we consider games of three broad classes (generated as detailed
in the Supplementary Information): games in which strategies have a clear transitive ordering (Figure 2.a);
games in which strategies have a cyclical structure wherein all but the final strategy are transitive with
respect to one another (Figure 2.d); and games with random (or no clear underlying) structure (Figure 2.g).
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Figure 2: Motivating example of various classes of two-player, symmetric zero-sum games. (a), (d), and (g),
respectively, visualize payoffs for instances of games with transitive, cyclical, and random structure. Despite
the numerous payoff variations possible in each class of games illustrated, each shares the underlying payoff
structure shown, respectively, in (b), (e), and (h). Moreover, variations in payoffs can notably impact the
difficulty of solving (i.e., finding the Nash equilibrium) of these games, as visualized in (c), (f), (i).
We shall see that the core characteristics of games with shared underlying structure is recovered via the
proposed analysis.
Each of these figures visualizes the payoffs corresponding to 4 instances of games of the respective class,
with each game involving 10 strategies per player; more concretely, entry M(si, sj) of each matrix visualized
in Figures 2.a, 2.d and 2.g quantifies the payoff received by the first player if the players, respectively,
use strategies si and sj . Despite the variance in payoffs evident in the instances of games exemplified
here, each essentially shares the payoff structure exposed by re-ordering their strategies, respectively, in
Figures 2.b, 2.e and 2.h. In other words, the visual representation of the payoffs in this latter set of figures
succinctly characterizes the ‘backbone’ of strategic interactions within these classes of games, despite not
being immediately apparent in the individual instances visualized.
More importantly, the complexity of learning useful mixed strategies to play in each of these games is
closely associated with this structural backbone. To exemplify this, consider the computational complexity
of solving each of these games (i.e., finding a Nash equilibrium). Specifically, we visualize this computational
complexity by using the Double Oracle algorithm63, which, starting from a sub-game consisting of a single
randomly-selected strategy, iteratively expands the strategy space until discovery of the Nash equilibrium
of the full underlying game. Figures 2.c, 2.f and 2.i visualize the distribution of Double Oracle iterations
needed to solve the corresponding games, under random initializations. Note, in particular, that although
the underlying payoff structure of the transitive and cyclical games respectively visualized in Figure 2.a and
Figure 2.d is similar, the introduction of a cycle in the latter class of games has a substantial impact on the
complexity of solving them (as evident in Figure 2.f). In particular, whereas the former class of games are
solved using a low (and deterministic) number of iterations, the latter class requires additional iterations
due to the presence of cycles increasing the number of strategies in the support of the Nash equilibrium.
Workflow Overall, characterization of the topological structure of games is an important and nuanced
problem. To address this problem, we use graph theory to build an analytical toolkit automatically summa-
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Figure 4: Cyclical game results. (a) game payoffs, (b) response graph, (c) cycles histogram, (d) spectral
response graph, (e) clustered response graph, (f) contracted response graph.
rizing the high-level strategic interactions within a game, and providing useful complexity measures thereof.
Specifically, consider again our motivating transitive game, re-visualized using a collection of graph-based
measures in Figure 3. Each of these measures provides a different viewpoint on the underlying game, col-
lectively characterizing it. Specifically, given the game payoffs, Figure 3.b visualizes the so-called α-Rank
response graph of the game; here, each node corresponds to a strategy (for either player, as the game’s
payoffs are symmetric). Transition probabilities between nodes are informed by a precise evolutionary model
(detailed in Methods and Omidshafiei et al. 72); roughly speaking, a directed edge from one strategy to
another indicates the players having a higher preference for the latter strategy, in comparison to the former.
The response graph, thus, visualizes all preferential interactions between strategies in the game. Moreover,
the color intensity of each node indicates its so-called α-Rank, which measures the long-term preference of
the players for that particular strategy, as dictated by the transition model mentioned above; specifically,
darker colors here indicate more preferable strategies.
This representation of a game as a graph enables a variety of useful insights into its underlying structure
and complexity. For instance, consider the distribution of cycles in the graph, which play an important role in
multiagent evaluation and training schemes4,72,95,103 and, as later shown, are correlated to the computational
complexity of solving two-player zero-sum games (e.g., via Double Oracle). Figure 3.f makes evident the lack
of cycles in the particular class of transitive games; while this is clearly apparent in the underlying (fully
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ordered) payoff visualization of Figure 3.a, it is less so in the unordered variants visualized in Figure 2.a. Even
so, the high-level relational structure between the strategies becomes significantly evident by conducting a
spectral analysis of the underlying game response graph. Full technical details of this procedure are provided
in the Methods section. At a high level, the so-called Laplacian spectrum (i.e., eigenvalues) of a graph,
along with associated eigenvectors, captures important information regarding it (e.g., number of spanning
trees, algebraic connectivity, and numerous related properties65). Reprojecting the response graph by using
the top eigenvectors yields the spectral response graph visualized in Figure 3.c, wherein similar strategies
are placed close to one another. Taking this one step further, one can cluster the spectral response graph,
yielding the clustered response graph, which exposes three classes of strategies in Figure 3.d: a fully dominated
strategy with only outgoing edges (a singleton cluster, on the bottom left of the graph), a transient cluster of
strategies with both incoming and outgoing edges (top cluster), and a dominant strategy with all incoming
edges (bottom right cluster). Finally, contracting the clustered graph by fusing nodes within each cluster
yields the high-level characterization of transitive games shown in Figure 3.e.
We can also conduct this analysis for instances of our other motivating games, such as the cyclical game
visualized in Figure 4.a. Note here the distinct differences with the earlier transitive game example; in the
cyclical game, the α-Rank distribution in the response graph (Figure 4.b) has higher entropy (indicating
preference for many strategies, rather than one, due to the presence of cycles). Moreover, the spectral
reprojection in Figure 4.d reveals a clear set of transitive nodes (left side of visualization) and a singleton
cluster of a cycle-inducing node (right side). Contracting this response graph reveals the fundamentally
cyclical nature of this game (Figure 4.f). Finally, we label each row and column of the original payoff table
Figure 4.a based on this clustering analysis, thus clearly identifying the final strategy as the outlier enforcing
the cyclical relationships in the game. Note that while there is no single graphical structure that summarizes
the particular class of random games visualized earlier in Figure 2.h, we include this analysis for several
instances of such games in the Supplementary Information.
Crucially, a key benefit of this analysis is that the game structure exposed is identical for all instances
of the transitive and cyclical games visualized earlier in Figures 2.a and 2.d, making it significantly easier
to characterize games with related structure, in contrast to raw analysis of payoffs. Our later case studies
further exemplify this, exposing related underlying structures for several classes of more complex games.
Analysis of Canonical and Real-World Games
The insights afforded by our graph-theoretic approach apply to both small canonical games and larger
empirical games (where strategies are synonymous with trained AI agents).
Canonical Games Consider the canonical Rock–Paper–Scissors game, involving a cycle among the three
strategies (wherein Rock loses to Paper, which loses to Scissors, which loses to Rock). Figure 5.I.a visualizes
a variant of this game involving a redundant copy of the first strategy, Rock, which introduces a redundant
cycle and thus affects the distribution of cycles in the game. Despite this, the spectral response graph
(Figure 5.I.d) reveals that the redundant game topologically remains the same as the original Rock–Paper–
Scissors game, thus reducing to the original game under spectral clustering.
This graph-based analysis also extends to general-sum games. As an example, consider the slightly more
complex game of 11-20, wherein two players each request an integer amount of money between 11 to 20 units
(inclusive). Each player receives the amount requested, though a bonus of 20 units is allotted to one player
if they request exactly 1 unit less than the other player. The payoffs and response graph of this game are
visualized, respectively, in Figures 5.II.a and 5.II.b, where strategies, from top-to-bottom and left-to-right
in the payoff table, correspond to increasing units of money being requested. This game, first introduced by
Arad and Rubinstein 2 , is structurally designed to analyze so-called k-level reasoning, wherein a level-0 player
is naive (i.e., here simply requests 20 units), and any level-k player responds to an assumed level-(k − 1)
opponent; e.g., here a level-1 player best responds to an assumed level-0 opponent, thus requesting 19 units
to ensure receiving the bonus units.
The spectral response graph here (Figure 5.II.d) reveals a more complex mix of transitive and intransitive
relations between strategies. Notably, the contracted response graph (Figure 5.II.f) reveals 7 clusters of
strategies. Referring back to the rows of payoffs in Figure 5.II.a, relabeled to match cluster colors, reveals
that our technique effectively pinpoints the sets of strategies that define the rules of the game: weak strategies
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Figure 5: Results for Redundant Rock–Paper–Scissors (RPS) and 11-20 game, in top and bottom rows,
respectively. In Redundant RPS, the redundant copy of the first strategy (Rock) is clustered in the spectral
response graph. In 11-20, seven clusters of strategies are revealed, exposing the cyclical nature of this game.
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Figure 6: Results for empirical games of AlphaGo (top) and MuJoCo soccer dataset (bottom). Note that as
these are empirical games, strategies here correspond to trained AI agents. In AlphaGo, the strong transitive
relationship between agents is revealed via our analysis. In MuJoCo soccer, more complex relations between
similarly-performing agents are revealed in the clusters produced.
(11 or 12 units, first two rows of the payoff table, and evident in the far-right of the clustered response graph),
followed by a set of intermediate strategies with higher payoffs (clustered pairwise, near the lower-center of
the clustered response graph), and finally the two key strategies that establish the cyclical relationship
within the game through k-level reasoning (19 and 20 units, corresponding to level-0 and level-1 players, in
the far-left of the clustered response graph).
This analysis extends to more complex instances of empirical games, which involve trained AI agents, as
next exemplified.
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Figure 7: Results for AlphaStar, with full league (top) and league with only best agents retained (bottom).
AlphaGo Consider first the game of Go, as played by 7 AlphaGo variants: AG(r), AG(p), AG(v), AG(rv),
AG(rp), AG(vp), and AG(rvp), where each variant uses the specified combination of rollouts r, value net-
works v, and/or policy networks p. We analyze the empirical game where each strategy corresponds to one
of these agents, and payoffs (Figure 6.I.a) correspond to the win rates of these agents when paired against
each other (as detailed by Silver et al. 93, Table 9). The α-Rank distribution indicated by the node (i.e.,
strategy) color intensities in Figure 6.I.b reveals AG(rvp) as a dominant strategy, and the cycle distribution
graph Figure 6.I.c reveals a lack of cycles here. The spectral response graph, however, goes further, revealing
a fully transitive structure (Figures 6.I.d and 6.I.e), as in the motivating transitive games discussed earlier.
The spectral analysis on this particular empirical game, therefore, reveals its simple underlying transitive
structure (Figure 6.I.f).
MuJoCo Soccer Consider a more interesting empirical game, wherein agents are trained to play soccer in
the continuous control domain of MuJoCo, exemplified in Figure 6 (second row). Each agent in this empirical
game is generated using a distinct set of training parameters (e.g., feedforward vs. recurrent policies, reward
shaping enabled and disabled, etc.), with full agent specifications and payoffs detailed by Liu et al. 59 . The
spectral response graph (Figure 6.II.e) reveals two outlier agents: a strictly dominated agent (node in the top-
right), and a strong (yet not strictly dominant) agent (node in the top-left). Several agents here are clustered
pairwise, revealing their closely-related interactions with respect to the other agents; such information could,
for example, be used to discard or fuse such redundant agents during training to save computational costs.
AlphaStar League Consider next a significantly larger-scale empirical game, consisting of 888 StarCraft II
agents from the AlphaStar Final league of Vinyals et al. 110 . StarCraft II is a notable example, involving a
choice of 3 races per player and realtime gameplay, making a wide array of behaviors possible in the game
itself. The empirical game considered is visualized in Figure 7.I.a, and is representative of a large number
of agents with varying skill levels. Despite its size, spectral analysis of this empirical game reveals that
several key subsets of closely-performing agents exist here, illustrated in Figure 7.I.d. Closer inspection
of the agents used to construct this empirical payoff table reveals the following insights, with agent types
corresponding to those detailed in Vinyals et al. 110 : i) the blue, orange, and green clusters are composed of
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Figure 8: Results for Blotto(5,3), Blotto(10,3), and Go (board size=3). Despite the significant difference
in sizes, both instances of Blotto yield a remarkably similar contracted response graph. Moreover, the
contracted response graph for Go is notably different from AlphaGo results, due to the latter being an
empirical game constructed from trained AI agents rather than a representative set of sampled policies.
agents in the initial phases of training, which are generally weakest (as observed in Figure 7.I.d, and also
visible as the narrow band of low payoffs in the top of Figure 7.I.a); ii) the red cluster consists primarily of
various, specialized ‘exploiter’ agents; iii) the purple and brown clusters are primarily composed of the ‘league
exploiters’ and ‘main agents’, with the latter being generally higher strength than the former. To further
ascertain the relationships between only the strongest agents, we remove the three clusters corresponding
to the weakest agents, repeating the analysis in Figure 7 (bottom row). Here, we observe the presence of
a series of progressively stronger agents (top nodes in Figure 7.II.d), as well as a single outlier agent which
quite clearly bests several of these clusters (bottom node of Figure 7.II.d).
An important caveat, as this stage, is that the agents in AlphaGo, MuJoCo soccer, and AlphaStar
above were trained to maximize performance, rather than to explicitly reveal insights into their respective
underlying games of Go, soccer, and StarCraft II. Thus, this analysis focused on characterizing relationships
between the agents from the ‘Policy Problem’ perspective, rather than the underlying games themselves,
which provide insights into the interestingness of the game (‘Problem Problem’). This latter investigation
would require a significantly larger population of agents, which cover the policy space of the underlying game
effectively, as exemplified next.
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Blotto Naturally, characterization of the underlying game can be achieved in games small enough where
all possible policies can be explicitly compared against one another. For instance, consider Blotto(τ, ρ), a
zero-sum two-player game wherein each player has τ tokens that they can distribute amongst ρ regions11. In
each region, each player with the most tokens wins (see Tuyls et al. 103 for additional details). In the variant
we analyze here, each player receives a payoff of +1, 0, and −1 per region respectively won, drawn, and
lost. The permutations of each player’s allocated tokens, in turn, induce strong cyclical relations between
the possible policies in the game. While the strategy space for this game is of size
(
τ+ρ−1
ρ−1
)
, payoffs matrices
can be fully specified for small instances, as shown for Blotto(5,3) and Blotto(10,3) in Figure 8 (first and
second row, respectively). Despite the differences in strategy space sizes in these particular instances of
Blotto, the contracted response graphs in Figures 8.I.d and 8.II.d capture the cyclical relations underlying
both instances, revealing a remarkably similar structure.
For larger games, the cardinality of the pure policy space typically makes it infeasible to fully enumerate
policies and construct a complete empirical payoff table. In these instances, we rely on sampling policies in a
manner that captures a set of representative policies, with varying transitive and intransitive relationships.
We use the policy sampling procedure proposed by Czarnecki et al. 20 , which also seeks a set of representative
policies for a given game. The specifics of this procedure are detailed in the Supplementary Information,
and at a high level involve three phases: i) using a combination of tree search algorithms, Alpha-Beta68 and
Monte Carlo Tree Search18, with varying tree depth limits for the former and varying number of simulations
allotted to the latter, thus yielding policies of varying transitive strengths; ii) using a range of random seeds
in each instantiation of the above algorithms, thus producing a range of policies for each level of transitive
strength; iii) repeating the same procedure with negated game payoffs, thus also covering the space of
policies that actively seek to lose the original game. While this sampling procedure is a heuristic, it produces
a representative set of policies with varying degrees of transitive and intransitive relations, and thus provides
an approximation of the underlying game that can be feasibly analyzed.
Go Let us revisit the example of Go, constructing our empirical game using the above policy sampling
scheme, rather than the AlphaGo agents used earlier. We analyze a variant of the game with board size
3 × 3, as shown in Figure 8 (third row). Notably, the contracted response graph (Figure 8.III.d) reveals
the presence of a strongly-cyclical structure in the underlying game, in contrast to the AlphaGo empirical
game (Figure 6). Moreover, the presence of a reasonably strong agent (visible in the top of the contracted
response graph) becomes evident here, though this agent also shares cyclical relations with several sets of
other agents. Overall, this analysis exemplifies the distinction between analyzing an underlying game (e.g.,
Go) versus analyzing the agent training process (e.g., AlphaGo). Investigation of links between these two
lines of analysis, we believe, makes for an interesting avenue for future work.
Linking response graph complexity to computational complexity A question that naturally arises
is whether certain measures over response graphs are correlated with the computational complexity of solving
their associated games. We investigate this in Figure 9, which compares several response graph complexity
measures against the number of iterations needed to solve a large collection of games using the double
oracle algorithm63. The results here consider specifically the α-Rank entropy, number of 3-cycles, and
mean in-degree (with details in Methods and results for additional measures included in the Supplementary
Information). As in earlier experiments, solution of small-scale games is conducted using payoffs over full
enumeration of pure policies, whereas that of larger games is done using the empirical games over sampled
policies. Each graph complexity measure reported is normalized with respect to the maximum measure
possible in a graph of the same size, and the number of iterations to solve is normalized with respect to the
number of strategies in the respective game. Thus, for each game, the normalized number of iterations to
solve provides a measure of its relative computational complexity compared to games with the same strategy
space size.
Several trends are of note in these results. First, the entropy of the α-Rank distribution associated
with each game correlates well with its computational complexity (see Spearman’s correlation coefficient
ρs in the top-right Figure 9.a). This matches intuition, as higher entropy α-Rank distributions indicate a
larger support over the strategy space (i.e., strong strategies, with non-zero α-Rank mass), thus requiring
additional iterations to solve. Moreover, the number of 3-cycles in the response graph also correlates well
with computational complexity, again matching intuition as the intransitivities introduced by cycles typically
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Game
0: Blotto(10,3)
1: Blotto(10,4)
2: Blotto(10,5)
3: 3-move parity game
4: Blotto(5,3)
5: Blotto(5,4)
6: Blotto(5,5)
7: AlphaStar league
8: Disc game
9: Elo game (noise=0.0)
10: Elo game (noise=0.1)
11: Elo game (noise=0.5)
12: Elo game (noise=1.0)
13: Kuhn Poker
14: Normal Bernoulli game
15: Rock-Paper-Scissors
16: Random Game of Skill
17: Transitive game
18: Connect Four
19: Go (board size=3)
20: Go (board size=4)
21: Hex (board size=3)
22: Misère Connect Four
23: Misère Hex (board size=3)
24: Misère Tic-Tac-Toe
25: Quoridor (board size=3)
26: Quoridor (board size=4)
27: Tic-Tac-Toe
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Figure 9: Response graph complexity vs. computational complexity of solving associated games. Each figure
plots a respective measure of graph complexity against the normalized number of iterations needed to solve
the associated game via the Double Oracle algorithm (with normalization done with respect to the total
number of strategies in each underlying game).
make it more difficult to traverse the strategy space5. Finally, the mean in-degree over all response graph
nodes correlates less so with computational complexity (though degree-based measures still serve a useful role
in characterizing and distinguishing graphs of differing sizes8). Overall, these results indicate that response
graph complexity provides a useful means of quantifying the computational complexity of games, bearing
potential for more formal future investigation.
The Landscape of Games
The results, thus far, have demonstrated that graph-theoretic analysis can simplify games (via spectral
clustering), uncover their topological structure (e.g., transitive structure of the AlphaGo empirical game),
and yield measures correlated to the computational complexity of solving these games. Overall, it is evident
that the perspective offered by graph theory yields a useful characterization of games across multiple fronts.
Given this insight, we next consider whether this characterization can be used to compare a widely-diverse
set of games.
To achieve this, we construct empirical payoff tables for a suite of games, using the policy sampling
scheme described earlier for the larger instances (also see Supplementary Information for full details, including
description of the games considered). For each game, we compute the response graphs and several associated
local and global complexity measures (e.g., α-Rank distribution entropy, number of 3-cycles, node-wise in-
and out-degree statistics, and several other measures detailed in the Methods section), which constitute a
feature vector capturing properties of interest. Finally, a principal component analysis of these features
yields the low-dimensional visualization of the landscape of games considered, shown in Figure 1.
We make several key insights given this empirical landscape of games. Notably, variations of games
with related rules are well-clustered together, indicating strong similarity despite the widely-varying sizes
of their policy spaces and empirical games used to construct them; specifically, all considered instances of
Blotto cluster together, with empirical game sizes ranging from 20 × 20 for Blotto(5,3) to 1000 × 1000 for
Blotto(10,5). Moreover, games with strong transitive components (e.g., variations of Elo games, AlphaStar
League, Random Game of Skill, and Normal Bernoulli Game) are also notably separated from strongly
cyclical games (Rock–Paper–Scissors, Disc game, and Blotto variations). Closely-related real-world games
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(e.g., Hex, Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four, and each of their respective Mise`re counterparts wherein players
seek to lose) are also well-clustered. Crucially, the strong alignment of this analysis with intuitions of the
similarity of certain classes of games serves as an important validation of the graph-based analysis technique
proposed in this work. Additionally, the analysis and corresponding landscape of games make clear that
several games of interest for AI seem well-clustered together, which also holds for less interesting games
(e.g., Transitive and Elo games). As such, we believe this type of investigation can be considered a method
to taxonomize which future games may be interesting, and which ones less so to train AI agents on.
The Problem Problem Revisited: Procedural Game Generation
Having now established various graph-theoretic tools for characterizing games of interest, we revisit the so-
called Problem Problem, which targets automatic generation of ‘interesting’ environments. At a high level,
we establish the feedback loop visualized in Figure 3, enabling automatic generation of games as driven by
our graph-based analytical workflow.
Full details of the game generation procedure are provided in the Methods Section. At a high level, given
a parameterization of a generated game that specifies an associated payoff tensor, we synthesize its response
graph and associated measures of interest (as done when generating the earlier landscape of games); we
use the multidimensional Elo parameterization for generating payoffs, due to its inherent ability to specify
complex transitive and intransitive games4. We then specify an objective function of interest to optimize
over these graph-based measures. As only the evaluations of such graph-based measures (rather than their
gradients) are typically available, we use a gradient-free approach to iteratively generate games optimizing
these measures (CMA-ES36 is used in our experiments).
Naturally, we can maximize any individual game complexity measures, or a combination thereof, directly
(e.g., entropy of the α-Rank distribution, number of 3-cycles, etc.). More interestingly, however, we can
leverage our low-dimensional landscape of games to directly drive the generation of new games towards
existing ones with properties of interest. Consider the instance of game generation shown in Figure 10.a,
which shows an overview of the above pipeline generating a 5 × 5 game minimizing Euclidean distance
(within the low-dimensional complexity landscape) to the standard 3× 3 Rock–Paper–Scissors game. Each
point on this plot corresponds to a generated game instance. The payoffs visualized, from left to right,
respectively correspond to the initial procedural game parameters (which specify a game with constant
payoffs), intermediate parameters, and final optimized parameters; projections of the corresponding games
within the games landscape are also indicated, with the targeted game of interest (Rock–Paper–Scissors
here) highlighted in green. Notably, the final optimized game exactly captures the underlying rules that
specify a general-size Rock–Paper–Scissors game, in that each strategy beats as many other strategies as it
loses to. In Figure 10.b, we consider a larger 13× 13 generated game, which seeks to minimize distance to a
1000× 1000 Elo game (which is transitive in structure, as in our earlier motivating example in Figure 2.a).
Once again, the generated game captures the transitive structure associated with Elo games.
Next, we consider generation of games that exhibit properties of mixtures of several target games. For
example, consider what happens if 3 × 3 Rock–Paper–Scissors were to be combined with the 1000 × 1000
Elo game above; one might expect a mixture of transitive and cyclical properties in the payoffs, though the
means of generating such mixed payoffs directly is not obvious due to the inherent differences in sizes of the
targeted games. Using our workflow, which conducts this optimization in the low-dimensional graph-based
landscape, we demonstrate a sequence of generated games targeting exactly this mixture in Figure 10.c.
Here, the game generation objective is to minimize Euclidean distance to the mixed principal components
of the two target games (weighted equally). The payoffs of the final generated game exhibit exactly the
properties intuited above, with predominantly positive (blue) upper-triangle of payoff entries establishing a
transitive structure, and the more sporadic positive entries in the lower-triangle establishing cycles.
Naturally, this approach opens the door to an important avenue for further investigation, targeting
generation of yet more interesting combinations of games of different sizes and rulesets (e.g., as in Figure 10.d,
which generates games targeting a mixture of Go (board size=3) and the AlphaStar League), and subsequent
training of AI agents using such a curriculum of generated games. Overall, these examples illustrate a key
benefit of the proposed graph-theoretic measures in that it captures the underlying structure of various
classes of games. The characterization of games enabled by our approach directly enables the navigation of
the associated games landscape to generate never-before-seen instances of games with fundamentally related
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Random Game of Skill
Elo game (noise=0.5)
AlphaStar league
Elo game (noise=0.1)
Normal Bernoulli game
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Transitive game
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(a) Generated game: 5× 5.
Target game: 3× 3 Rock–Paper–Scissors.
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(b) Generated game: 13× 13.
Target game: 1000× 1000 Elo game.
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(c) Generated game: 13× 13.
Target games: 3 × 3 Rock–Paper–Scissors and 1000 ×
1000 Elo game.
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(d) Generated game: 19× 19.
Target games: AlphaStar League and Go (board
size=3).
Figure 10: Visualization of procedural game generation projected in the games landscape. Each figure
visualizes the generation of a game of specified size, which targets a pre-defined game (or mixture of games)
of a different size. The three payoffs in each respective figure, from left to right, correspond to the initial
procedural game parameters, intermediate parameters, and final optimized parameters. Strategies are sorted
by mean payoffs in (b) and (c) to more easily identify transitive structures expected from an Elo game.
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structure.
Discussion
In 1965, mathematician Alexander Kronrod stated that “chess is the Drosophila of artificial intelligence”62,
referring to the genus of flies used extensively for genetics research. This parallel drawn to biology invites
the question of whether a family, order, or, more concretely, shared structures linking various games can
be identified. Our work demonstrated a means of revealing this topological structure, extending beyond
related works investigating this question for small classes of games (e.g., 2 × 2 games19,79,80). We believe
that such a topological landscape of games can help to identify and generate related games of interest
for AI agents to tackle, as targeted by the Problem Problem, hopefully significantly extending the reach
of AI system capabilities. As such, this paper presented a comprehensive study of games under the lens
of graph theory and empirical game theory, operating on the response graph of any game of interest. The
proposed approach applies to general-sum, many-player games, enabling richer understanding of the inherent
relationships between strategies (or agents), contraction to a representative (and smaller) underlying game,
and identification of a game’s inherent topology. We highlighted insights offered by this approach when
applied to a large suite of games, including canonical games, empirical games consisting of trained agent
policies, and real-world games consisting of representative sampled policies, extending well beyond typical
characterizations of games using raw payoff visualizations, cardinal measures such as strategy or game tree
sizes, or strategy rankings. We demonstrated that complexity measures associated with the response graphs
analyzed correlate well to the computational complexity of solving these games, and importantly enable the
visualization of the landscape of games in relation to one another (as in Figure 1).
The games landscape exposed here was then leveraged to procedurally generate games, providing a prin-
cipled means of better understanding and facilitating the solution of the so-called Problem Problem. While
the classes of games generated in this paper were restricted to the normal-form (e.g., generalized variants of
Rock–Paper–Scissors), they served as an important validation of the proposed approach. Specifically, this
work provides a foundational layer for generating games that are of interest in a richer context of domains.
As such, an important line of future work will involve generalization of this approach to generation of more
complex games, e.g., by optimizing parameters associated with richer underlying games (e.g., goal sizes or
opponent speed variations for training drills in MuJoCo soccer, deck variations in Poker, map variations
in games such as Capture-the-Flag48, etc.) and synthesizing associated empirical payoff tensors to bet-
ter navigate the game landscape. Moreover, as the principle contribution of this paper was to establish a
graph-theoretic approach for investigating the landscape of games, we focused our investigation on empirical
analysis of a large suite of games. As such, for larger games, our analysis relied on sampling of a representa-
tive set of policies to characterize them. Thus, a limitation of this approach is that such a policy sampling
scheme can be inherently expensive for extremely large games, making it important to further investigate
alternative sampling schemes. Consideration of an expanded set of such policies (e.g., those that balance
the odds for players by ensuring a near-equal win probability) and correlations between the empirical game
complexity and the complexity of the underlying policy representations (e.g., deep versus shallow neural
networks or, whenever possible, Boolean measures of strategic complexity29,87) also seem interesting to in-
vestigate. Finally, our approach is general enough to be applicable to other areas in social and life sciences,
which can be modeled either as response graphs over games; applications of these game-theoretic techniques
to characterize the complex ecologies in these related fields would be an interesting application area.
Overall, we hope that this work paves the way for related investigations of theoretical properties of
graph-based games analysis, and further links to related works investigating the geometry and structure of
games5,19,20,45,79,80.
Methods
We present a detailed overview of the underlying methodology and techniques used for conducting the graph
theoretic analysis in this work.
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Prerequisites
Games Our work applies to K-player, general-sum games, wherein each player k ∈ [K] has a finite set
Sk of pure strategies. The space of pure strategy profiles is denoted S =
∏
k S
k, where a specific pure
strategy profile instance is denoted s = (s1, . . . , sK) ∈ S. For a give profile s ∈ S, the payoffs vector
is denoted M(s) = (M1(s), . . . ,MK(s)) ∈ RK , where Mk(s) is the payoff for each player k ∈ [k]. We
denote by s−k the profile of strategies used by all but the k-th player. A game is said to be zero-sum if∑
kM
k(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S. A game is said to be symmetric if all players have the same strategy set,
and Mk(s1, . . . , sK) = Mρ(k)(sρ(1), . . . , sρ(K)) for all permutations ρ, strategy profiles s, and player indices
k ∈ [K].
Empirical games For the real-world games considered (e.g., Go, Tic–Tac–Toe, etc.), we conduct our
analysis using an empirical game theoretic approach77,104,112,118,119. Specifically, rather than consider the
space of all pure strategies in the game (which can be enormous, even in the case of, e.g., Tic–Tac–Toe),
we construct an empirical game over meta-strategies, which can be considered higher-level strategies over
atomic actions. In empirical games, a meta-strategy sk for each player k corresponds to a sampled policy
(e.g., in the case of our real-world games examples), or an AI agent (e.g., in our study of AlphaGo, where
each meta-strategy was a specific variant of AlphaGo). Empirical game payoffs are calculated according to
the win/loss ratio of these meta-strategies against one another, over many trials of the underlying games.
From a practical perspective, game-theoretic analysis applies to empirical games (over agents) in the same
manner as standard games (over strategies); thus, we consider strategies and agents as synonymous in this
work. Overall, empirical games provide a useful abstraction of the underlying game that enables the study
of significantly larger and more complex interactions.
Finite population models and α-Rank In game theory33,47,67,84,116, one often seeks algorithms or
models for evaluating and training strategies with respect to one another (i.e., models that produce a
score or ranking over strategy profiles, or an equilibrium over them). As a specific example, the Double
Oracle algorithm63, which is used to quantify the computational complexity of solving games in some of our
experiments, converges to Nash equilibria, albeit only in two-player zero-sum games. More recently, a line
of research has introduced and applied the α-Rank algorithm66,72,82 for evaluation of strategies in general-
sum, n-player many-strategy games. α-Rank leverages notions from stochastic evolutionary dynamics in
finite populations46,69,70,97,99,100 in the limit of rare mutations31,108,109, which are subsequently analyzed to
produce these scalar ratings (one per strategy or agent). At a high level, α-Rank models the probability
of a population transitioning from a given strategy to a new strategy, by considering the additional payoff
the population would receive via such a deviation. These evolutionary relations are considered between all
strategies in the game, and are summarized in its so-called response graph. α-Rank then uses the stationary
distribution over this response graph to quantify the long-term propensity of playing each of the strategies,
assigning a scalar score to each.
Overall, α-Rank yields a useful representation of the limiting behaviors of the players, providing a sum-
mary of the characteristics of the underlying game–albeit a 1-dimensional one (a scalar rating per strategy
profile). In our work, we exploit the higher-dimensional structural properties of the α-Rank response graph,
to make more informed characterizations of the underlying game, rather than compute scalar rankings.
Response graphs The α-Rank response graph72 provides the mathematical model that underpins our
analysis. It constitutes an analogue (yet, not equivalent) model of the invasion graphs used to describe
the evolution dynamics in finite populations in the limit when mutations are rare (see, e.g., Fudenberg and
Imhof 31 , Hauert et al. 39 , Segbroeck et al. 91 , Vasconcelos et al. 108). In this small-mutation approximation,
directed edges stand for the fixation probability70 of a single mutant in a monomorphic population of
resident individuals (the vertices), such that all transitions are computed through a processes involving
only two strategies at a time. Here, we use a similar approach. Let us consider a pure strategy profile
s = (s1, . . . , sK). Consider a unilateral deviation (corresponding to a mutation) of player k from playing
sk ∈ Sk to a new strategy σk ∈ Sk, thus resulting in a new profile σ = (σk, s−k). The response graph
associated with the game considers all such deviations, defining transition probabilities between all pairs of
strategy profiles involving a unilateral deviation. Specifically, let Es,σ denote the transition probability from
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s to σ (where the latter involves a unilateral deviation), defined as
Es,σ =
{
η
1−exp(−α(Mk(σ)−Mk(s)))
1−exp(−αm(Mk(σ)−Mk(s))) if M
k(σ) 6= Mk(s)
η
m otherwise ,
(1)
where η is a normalizing factor denoting the reciprocal of the total number of unilateral deviations from a
given strategy profile, i.e., η = (
∑K
l=1(|Sl| − 1))−1. Furthermore, α ≥ 0 and m ∈ N are parameters of the
underlying evolutionary model considered and denote, respectively, to the so-called selection pressure and
population size.
To further simplify the model and avoid sweeps over these parameters, we consider here the limit of
infinite-α introduced by Omidshafiei et al. 72 , which specifies transitions from lower-payoff profiles to higher-
payoff ones with probability η(1 − ε), the reverse transition with probability ηε, and transition between
strategies of equal payoff with probability η/2, where 0 < ε  1 is a small perturbation factor. We use
ε = 1e − 10 in our experiments, and found low sensitivity of results to this choice given a sufficiently small
value. For further theoretical exposition of α-Rank under this infinite-α regime, see Rowland et al. 82 . Given
the pairwise strategy transitions defined as such, the self-transition probability of s is subsequently defined
as,
Es,s = 1−
∑
k∈[K]
σ|σk∈Sk\{sk}
Es,σ . (2)
As mentioned earlier, if two strategy profiles s and σ do not correspond to a unilateral deviation (i.e., differ
in more than one player’s strategy), no transition occurs between them under this model (i.e., Es,σ = 0).
The transition structure above is informed by particular models in evolutionary dynamics as explained in
detail in Omidshafiei et al. 72 . The introduction of the perturbation term ε effectively ensures the ergodicity
of the associated Markov chain with row-stochastic transition matrix E. This transition structure then
enables definition of the α-Rank response graph of a game.
Definition 1 (Response graph) The response graph of a game is a weighted directed graph (digraph)
G = (S,E) where each node corresponds to a pure strategy profile s ∈ S, and each weighted edge Es,σ
quantifies the probability of transitioning from profile s to σ.
For example, the response graph associated with a transitive game is visualized in Figure 3.b, where each node
corresponds to a strategy s, and directed edges indicate transition probabilities between nodes. Omidshafiei
et al. 72 define α-Rank pi ∈ ∆|S|−1 as a probability distribution over the strategy profiles S, by ordering the
masses of the stationary distribution of E (i.e., solution of the eigenvalue problem piTE = piT ). Effectively,
the α-Rank distribution quantifies the average amount of time spent by the players in each profile s ∈ S
under the associated discrete-time evolutionary population model31. Our proposed methodology uses the α-
Rank response graphs in a more refined manner, quantifying the structural properties defining the underlying
game, as detailed in the workflow outlined in Figure 3 and, in more detail, below.
Workflow: Spectral, clustered, and contracted response graphs
This section details the workflow used to for spectral analysis of games’ response graphs (i.e., the steps
visualized in Figure 3.c to Figure 3.e). Response graphs are processed in two stages: i) symmetrization
(i.e., transformation of the directed response graphs to an associated undirected graph), and ii) subsequent
spectral analysis. This two-phase approach is a standard technique for analysis of directed graphs, which
has proved effective in a large body of prior works (see Malliaros and Vazirgiannis 61 , Van Lierde 106 for
comprehensive surveys). Additionally, spectral analysis of the response graph is closely-associated with the
eigenvalue analysis required when solving for the α-Rank distribution, establishing a shared formalism of
our techniques with those of prior works.
Symmetrization Let A denote the adjacency matrix of the response graph G, where A = E as G is
a directed weighted graph. We seek a transformation such that response graph strategies with similar
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relationships to neighboring strategies tend to have higher adjacency with one another. Bibliometric sym-
metrization88 provides a useful means to do so in application to directed graphs, whereby the symmetrized
adjacency matrix is defined A˜ = AAT + ATA. Intuitively, in the first term, AAT , the (s, σ)-th entry
captures the weighted number of other strategies that both s and σ would deviate to in the response graph
G; the same entry in the second term, ATA, captures the weighted number of other strategies that would
deviate to both s and σ. Hence, this symmetrization captures the relationship of each pair of response graph
nodes (s, σ) with respect to all other nodes, ensuring high values of weighted adjacency when these strategies
have similar relational roles with respect to all other strategies in the game. More intuitively, this ensures
that in games such as Redundant Rock–Paper–Scissors (see Figure 5, first row), sets of redundant strategies
are considered to be highly adjacent to each other.
Spectral response graphs Following bibliometric symmetrization of the response graph, clustering pro-
ceeds as follows. Specifically, for any partitioning of the strategy profiles S into sets S1 ⊂ S and S¯1 = S \S1,
define w(S1, S¯1) =
∑
s∈S1,σ∈S¯1 Es,σ. Let the sets of disjoint strategy profiles {Sk}k∈[K] partition S (i.e.,⋃
k∈[K] Sk = S). Define the K-cut of graph G under partitions {Sk}k∈[K] as
cut({Sk}) =
∑
k
w(Sk, S¯k) , (3)
which, roughly speaking, measures the connectedness of points in each cluster; i.e., a low cut indicates that
points across distinct clusters are not well-connected. A standard technique for cluster analysis of graphs is
to choose the set of K partitions, {Sk}k∈[K], which minimizes (3). In certain situations, balanced clusters
(i.e., clusters with similar numbers of nodes) may be desirable; here, a more suitable metric is the so-called
normalized K-cut, or Ncut, of graph G under partitions {Sk}k∈[K],
Ncut({Sk}) =
∑
k
w(Sk, S¯k)
w(Sk, S)
. (4)
Unfortunately, the minimization problem associated with (4) is NP-hard even when K = 2 (see Shi and
Malik 92). A typical approach is to consider a spectral relaxation of this minimization problem, which
corresponds to a generalized eigenvalue problem (i.e., efficiently solved via standard linear algebra); interested
readers are referred to Shi and Malik 92 , Van Lierde 106 for further exposition. Define the Laplacian matrix
L = D − A˜ (respectively, L = I − D−1/2A˜D−1/2), where degree matrix D has diagonal entries Di,i =∑
j A˜i,j , and zeroes elsewhere. Then the eigenvectors associated with the lowest nonzero eigenvalues of L
provide the desired spectral projection of the datapoints (i.e., spectral response graph), with the desired
number of projection dimensions corresponding to the number of eigenvectors kept. We found that using
the unnormalized graph Laplacian L = D − A˜ yielded intuitive projections in our experiments, which we
visualize 2-dimensionally in our results (e.g., see Figure 3.c).
Clustered and contracted response graphs The relaxed clustering problem detailed above is sub-
sequently solved by application of a standard clustering algorithm to the spectral-projected graph nodes.
Specifically, we use agglomerative average-linkage clustering in our experiments (see Rokach and Maimon 81,
Chapter 15 for details). For determining the appropriate number of clusters, we use the approach introduced
by Pham et al. 76 , which we found to yield more intuitive clusterings than the gap statistic98 for the games
considered.
Following computation of clustered response graphs (e.g., Figure 3.d), we contract clustered nodes (sum-
ming edge probabilities accordingly), as in Figure 3.e. Note that for clarity, our visualizations only show
edges corresponding to transitions from lower-payoff to higher-payoff strategies in the standard, spectral,
and clustered response graphs, as these bear the majority of transition mass between nodes; reverse edges
(from higher- to lower-payoff nodes) and self-transitions are not visually indicated, despite being used in
the underlying spectral clustering. The exception is for contracted response graphs, where we do visualize
weighted edges from higher- to lower-payoff nodes; this is due to the node contraction process potentially
yielding edges with non-negligible weight in both directions.
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Workflow: Low-dimensional landscape & game generation
We next detail the approach used to compute the games landscape and to procedurally generate games, as
respectively visualized in Figures 1 and 10.
Low-dimensional games landscape To compute the low-dimensional games landscape, we use principal
component analysis (PCA) of key features associated with the games’ response graphs. Specifically, we use
a collection of features we found to correlate well with the underlying computational complexity of solving
these games (as detailed in the Results section).
Specifically, using the response graph G of each game, we compute in- and out-degrees for all nodes, the
entropy of the α-Rank distribution pi, and the total number of 3-cycles. We normalize each of these measures
as follows: dividing node-wise in- and out-degrees via the maximum possible degrees for a response graph of
the same size; dividing the α-Rank distribution entropy via the entropy of the uniform distribution of the
same size; finally, dividing the number of 3-cycles via the same measure for a fully connected directed graph.
We subsequently construct a feature vector consisting of the normalized α-Rank distribution entropy,
the normalized number of 3-cycles, and statistics related to normalized in- and out-degrees. Specifically,
we consider the mean, median, standard deviation, skew, and kurtosis of the in- and out-degrees across
all response graph nodes, similar to the NetSimile8 approach, which characterized undirected graphs. This
yields a feature vector of fixed size for all games. We subsequently conduct a PCA analysis of the resulting
feature vectors, visualizing the landscape in Figure 1 via projection of the feature vectors onto the top two
principal components, yielding a low-dimensional embedding vg for each game g.
Multidimensional Elo The games generated in Figures 2 and 10 use the multidimensional Elo (mElo)
parametric structure4, an extension of the classical Elo27 rating system used in Chess and other games. In
mElo games, each strategy i is characterized by two sets of parameters: i) a scalar rating ri ∈ R capturing the
strategy’s transitive strength, and ii) a 2k-dimensional vector ci capturing the strategy’s intransitive relations
to other strategies. The payoff a strategy i receives when played against a strategy j in a mElo game is
defined by M(i, j) = σ(ri − rj + cTi Ωcj) where σ(z) = (1 + exp(−z))−1, Ω =
∑k
i=1
(
e2i−1eT2i − e2ieT2i−1
)
,
and ei is the unit vector with coordinate i equal to 1. This parametric structure is particularly useful as
it enables definition of a wide array of games, ranging from those with fully transitive strategic interactions
(e.g., those with a single dominant strategy, as visualized in Figure 2.a), to intransitive interactions (e.g.,
those with cyclical relations, as visualized in Figure 2.d), to a mix thereof.
Procedural game generation The procedural game generation visualized in Figure 10 is conducted as
follows. First, we compute the low-dimensional game embeddings for the collection of games of interest, as
detailed above. Next, for an initially randomly-generated mElo game of the specified size and rank k, we
concatenate the associated mElo parameters ri and ci for all strategies, yielding a vector of length |S|(1+2k)
fully parameterizing the mElo game, and constituting the decision variables of the optimization problem used
to generate new games. We used a rank 5 mElo parameterization for all game generation experiments. For
any such setting of mElo parameters, we compute the associated mElo payoff matrix M , then the associated
response graph and features, and finally project these features onto the principal components previously
computed for the collection of games of interest, yielding the projected mElo components vmElo.
Subsequently, given a game g of interest that we would like to structurally mimic via our generated mElo
game, we use a gradient-free optimizer, CMA-ES36, to minimize ||vmElo − vg||22 by appropriately setting
the mElo parameters. For targeting mixtures of games (e.g., as in Figures 10.c and 10.d), we simply use a
weighted mixture of their principal components vg (with equal weights used in our experiments). We found
the opens-source implementation of CMA-ES37 to converge to suitable parameters within 20 iterations for
all experiments, with the exception of the larger game generation results visualized in Figure 10.d, which
required 40 iterations.
Statistics
To generate the distributions of Double Oracle iterations needed to solve the motivating examples (Figure 2),
we used 20 generated games per class (transitive, cyclical, random), showing four examples of each in
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Figures 2.a, 2.d and 2.g. For each of these 20 games, we used 10 random initializations of the Double Oracle
algorithm, reporting the full distribution of iterations. To generate the complexity results in Figure 9, we
likewise used 10 random initializations of Double Oracle per game, with standard deviations shown in the
scatter plots (which may require zooming in). For the Spearman correlation coefficients shown in each of
Figures 9.a to 9.c, the reported p-value is two-sided.
Data Availability
We use OpenSpiel54 as the backend providing many of the games and associated payoff datasets studied
here (see Supplementary Information for details). Payoff datasets for empirical games in the literature are
referenced in the main text.
Code Availability
We use OpenSpiel54 for the implementation of α-Rank and Double Oracle.
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Supplementary Information
Related Work
This paper largely focuses on what kinds of interactions and environments present interesting challenges for
artificial agents. As such, this work sits at the intersection of several different research disciplines, including
game theory, machine learning, and network science.
The central question revolving around the interestingness of environments for artificial learning agents
has a long history in machine learning. Initial work concerned the use of curricula of tasks in training
neural networks via supervised learning7,26,52,86. This continues to be an active field of research to this
day, with many new methods for curriculum learning being developed to match the increasingly intricate
architectures used within deep learning34,35,117, and the increasingly wide range of applications for deep
neural networks, such as deep reinforcement learning16,30,49,94,110. Recent work has brought open-ended
learning via multiagent interaction and procedural environment generation to the forefront of curriculum
learning5,20,28,49,56,113.
This work contributes to this line of inquiry by framing the intrinsic interestingness of games as a driving
factor in open-ended multiagent learning. While equilibrium computation in many classes of games is PPAD-
complete (thus generally considered intractable14,21,22), and while the computational complexity results in
this work focus on the two-player zero-sum case, it is worth mentioning that our methods also directly apply
to many-player general-sum settings (as exemplified by the analysis of the general-sum 11-20 game in the
main text, and of many-player variants of Kuhn Poker in Figure 12).
Several prior works have analyzed game-theoretic response graphs from the perspective of agent evalu-
ation1,64,66,72,82,105,114, and more generally there is a wide literature concerning analysis of directed graphs
across a range of domains and disciplines17,40,50,74. Additionally, there is an established line of work in game
theory that seeks a discrete classification of games based on payoff tables. The space of 2x2 normal-form
games have been classified into groups with restrictions, such as ordering the payouts58,79, and into a periodic
table through topological and graph-theoretic techniques80. More recent work has introduced a framework
for binary classification of agent behaviors (e.g., as strategic and non-strategic) in simultaneous-move normal
form games120.
Social dilemma games (such as Prisoners Dilemma, Chicken, or Hoarding), categorized by Dawes 23 ,
Liebrand 58 , are a subset of games encapsulating the trade-offs found in social dilemmas. Social dilem-
mas such as the tragedy of the commons show the potential conflict between individual and group self-
interest38,71,78. Early work in social dilemmas showed how the dilemmas can arise from reinforced behav-
ior78. More recently, reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to sequential social dilemmas55 where
strategic decisions to cooperate or defect were shown to coincide with the learning of policies. Agent behavior
was also shown to depend on factors such as the relative difficulties of learning policies and in the case of
cooperation, possibly non-occurring coordination sub-problems. RL has also been used to train agents which
cooperate with humans across a variety of two-player repeated games19.
In addition to analysis of individual graphs, there has been much work on the analysis and clustering of
collections of graphs in a variety of contexts8,51,85,101. The graph-based analysis conducted herein draws on
these works (e.g., using several local and global graph features and distributions to characterize our games,
as in Berlingerio et al. 8). However, our approach focuses specifically on games, exploiting several mea-
sures related to the complexity of games, enabling navigation of their underlying landscape and subsequent
generation of new games of interest.
A wide-spread strategy comparison method in machine learning is the Elo rating27 which ranks agents
against one another in a purely transitive manner. Balduzzi et al. 4 showed the importance of intransitive
strategies when comparing agents, leading to the so called multidimensional Elo model, modeling more
complex relations between agents. Finally, in a line of work related to training of agents, Policy-Space
Response Oracles (PSRO)53 and Rectified PSRO5 lead to learning a collection of possibly intransitive
strategies, but not to directly analyze them, as done in this paper.
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Methods: Additional details
This section provides additional discussions and exposition of methods.
Policy sampling scheme
The policy sampling scheme we use for large, real-world games follows the policy space coverage procedure
first specified by Czarnecki et al. 20 , and is detailed as follows:
1. We use a tree search algorithm, Alpha-Beta68 with varying tree depth limits d, and seeds s. This
involves running the Alpha-Beta algorithm to depth d, and using random actions with seed s thereafter
(i.e., if the game does not terminate). This yields policies of varying transitive strengths (controlled
by depth d), with a range of related policies per depth (controlled by seed s). This also covers the case
of a purely random policy when d is set to 0 (with seed s controlling the randomness).
2. We repeat the same procedure with negated game payoffs, thus also covering the space of policies that
seek to lose the original game.
3. To further expand the policy space, we also define an augmented Alpha-Beta search, which assumes
that branches of the game tree with depth beyond d have a value of 0. We likewise run this variant
with negated payoffs as well.
4. to cover the policy space for more difficult games, we further augment this sampling strategy by using
MCTS18 on each game, with k simulations and varying seeds s.
For each variant of Alpha-Beta detailed above, we use depth parameters d ∈ {1, . . . , 9}. For MCTS, we
use k ∈ {10, 100, 1000} simulations. For all algorithms, we also sweep over seeds s ∈ {1, . . . , 50}. While
this sampling procedure is a heuristic, it produces a range of policies with varying degrees of transitive and
intransitive relations, and thus provide a useful approximation of the underlying game.
Description of games analyzed
We provide an overview of the games analyzed (noting that we omit descriptions of 11-20, AlphaGo, MuJoCo
soccer, Blotto, and AlphaStar League, as they are detailed in the main text). As our methods operate on α-
Rank response graphs, they apply to many-player general-sum games. For the specific instances of two-player
zero-sum games analyzed here, we symmetrize payoffs and standardize them such that M ∈ [−1, 1].
Redundant Rock–Paper–Scissors We modify the standard Rock–Paper–Scissors payoffs, MRPS , by
duplicating the first strategy (Rock), yielding the payoffs for the redundant variant, MRRPS ,
MRPS =
 0 −1 11 0 −1
−1 1 0
 MRRPS =

0 0 −1 1
0 0 −1 1
1 1 0 −1
−1 −1 1 0
 . (5)
Disc game The Disc game is a cyclical game, defined as a differentiable generalization of the standard
game of Rock–Paper–Scissors5. We construct the Disc game payoffs as in Czarnecki et al. 20 , by first
uniformly sampling 1000 points, {Si}i∈[1000], in the unit circle, subsequently defining payoffs,
M(i, j) = STi
[
0 −1
1 0
]
Sj . (6)
Elo games and noisy variants The variety of Elo games essentially correspond to the multidimensional
Elo model detailed in the main paper, with the intransitive components removed, and payoffs rescaled. Noisy
variants of these Elo games are generated via specifying a noise parameter σ2, adding zero-mean normally
distributed noise of the specified variance to the non-noisy Elo payoff table, thus yielding noisy payoffs Mσ2 .
Finally, we symmetrize these payoffs, yielding final payoffs M = Mσ2 −MTσ2 .
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Games in motivating examples The variants of transitively-structured games in the motivating ex-
amples are Elo games, as specified above. The cyclical games are N × N mElo games of rank k = 1,
with all transitive r set to 0, and intransitive components specified as follows: c0:N−2,0 = [0, 1, . . . , N − 2],
c0:N−2,1 = [N − 2, N − 1, . . . , 0], and cN−1,: = [−1, 1] The random-structured games are mElo games with
rank k = 3, and transitive and intransitive parameters i.i.d. sampled from N (0, 1).
Transitive game The Transitive Game payoffs are simply set to +1 for the upper-triangle, −1 for the
lower-triangle, and 0 across the diagonal.
Random Game of Skill The Random Game of Skill is a 1000×1000 game, generated as defined by Czar-
necki et al. 20 . Specifically, payoffs are M(i, j) = 0.5(Wij −Wji) + Si − Sj , where Wij , Wji, Si, and Sj are
sampled from N (0, 1). In the Normal Bernoulli Game, parameters Si and Sj are sampled likewise, while
Wij and Wji are sampled from U(0, 1) and payoffs are specified as M(i, j) = Wij −Wji + Si − Sj .
3-move parity game The parity game is generated per the definition in Czarnecki et al. 20 .
Real-world games We use the OpenSpiel54 implementations of the following games: Tic–Tac–Toe, Hex
(board size=3), Quoridor (board size=3), Quoridor (board size=4), Go (board size=3), Go (board size=4),
Connect Four, Kuhn Poker. For Go, we use a Komi (first-move advantage) of 6.5 points. With the exception
of Kuhn Poker (which has only 12 information states, and fully enumerable policy space), we use the policy
sampling scheme detailed above for this collection of games.
Additional results
This section provides additional results, including response graphs and experiments conducted for generating
the landscapes in the main text, which could not be included there due to figure limits.
Motivating examples: results for randomly-generated games
Figure 11 illustrates a sample of response graphs for generated games of random structure, as discussed in
the Motivating Examples section of the main text.
Additional response graph analysis
For completeness, Figures 12 to 17 present the response graph-based analysis for the additional games consid-
ered in the main text. Figure 12 is of particular note here, as it exemplifies the application of the methodology
to asymmetric, many-player games. Specifically, the empirical games constructed here correspond to agents
trained via extensive-form fictitious play (XFP)41 in 2-, 3-, and 4-player variants of Kuhn Poker.
Additional complexity results
Figure 18 provides an overview of additional response graph-based measures, in comparison to the normalized
number of iterations required to solve each of the games considered in the main text.
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Figure 11: Results for randomly-generated games.
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Figure 12: Additional response graph analysis results I. Specifically, these results pertain to Kuhn Poker
agents trained via extensive-form fictitious play (XFP)41, with empirical games constructed as detailed
in Omidshafiei et al. 72 .
31
Payoffs Spectral graph Clustered graph Contracted graph
B
lo
tt
o
(5
,4
)
(I.a) (I.b) (I.c) (I.d)
B
lo
tt
o(
5,
5)
(II.a) (II.b) (II.c) (II.d)
B
lo
tt
o
(1
0
,4
)
(III.a) (III.b) (III.c) (III.d)
B
lo
tt
o(
10
,5
)
(IV.a) (IV.b) (IV.c) (IV.d)
Figure 13: Additional response graph analysis results II.
32
Payoffs Spectral graph Clustered graph Contracted graph
3
m
ov
e
p
a
ri
ty
g
a
m
e
(I.a) (I.b) (I.c) (I.d)
K
u
h
n
P
o
k
er
(II.a) (II.b) (II.c) (II.d)
D
is
c
ga
m
e
(III.a) (III.b) (III.c) (III.d)
N
or
m
al
B
er
n
o
u
ll
i
G
am
e
(IV.a) (IV.b) (IV.c) (IV.d)
R
an
d
om
ga
m
e
of
sk
il
l
(V.a) (V.b) (V.c) (V.d)
Figure 14: Additional response graph analysis results III.
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Figure 15: Additional response graph analysis results IV.
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Figure 16: Additional response graph analysis results V.
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Figure 17: Additional response graph analysis results VI.
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Figure 18: Response graph complexity vs. computational complexity of solving associated games. Each
figure plots a respective measure of graph complexity against the normalized number of iterations needed to
solve the associated game via the double oracle algorithm (with normalization done with respect to the total
number of strategies in each underlying game). Note that mean node-wise in- and out-degrees (in (c) and
(h), respectively) match across the games here due to the degree sum formula; other distributional statistics,
however, do not necessarily match across in- and out-degrees, as evident above.
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